Bibliographie

Créé le

13.02.2020

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Arcuri G. et N. Levratto (2018), « Early Stage SME Bankruptcy: Does the Local Banking Market Matter », Small Business Economics, April, pp. 1-16.

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Berger A.N. et G.F. Udell (2002), « Small Business Credit Availability and Relationship Lending: The Importance of Bank Organizational Structure », The Economic Journal, vol 112, pp. 32-53.

Berlin M. et L.J. Mester (1992), « Debt Covenant and Renegotiation », Journal of Financial Intermediation, vol 2 (2), pp. 95-133.

Bergman Y.Z. et J.L. Callen (1991), « Opportunistic Underinvestment in Deby Renegotiation and Capital Structure », Journal of Financial Economics, vol 29 (1), pp. 137-171.

Betker B.L. (1997), « The Administrative Costs of Debt Restructurings: Some Recent Evidences », Financial Management, vol 26 (4), pp. 56-68.

Blazy R. et B. Chopard (2004), « Ex Post Efficiency of Bankruptcy Procedures: A General Normative Framework », International Review of law and Economics, vol 24 (4), pp. 447-471.

Blazy R., J. Martel et N. Nigham (2014), « The Choice between Informal and Formal Restructuring: The Case of French Banks », Journal of Banking and Finance, vol 44, pp. 248-263.

Brown C., R. James et N. Mooradiaan (1993), « The Information Content of Distressed Restructurings Involving Public and Private Debt Claims », Journal of Financial Economics, vol 33 (1), pp. 93-118.

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Brunner A. et J.P. Krahnen (2008), « Muliple Lenders and Corporate Distress: Evidence on Debt Restructuring », The Review of Economic Studies, vol 75 (2), pp. 415-422.

Claessens S., S. Djankov et L. Klapper (2003), « Resolution of Corporate Distress in East Asia », Journal of Empiricale Finance, vol 10 (1-2), pp. 299-316.

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Daigle K.H. et M.T. Maloney (1994), « Residual Claims in Bankruptcy: An Agency Theory Explanation », The Journal of Law and Economics, vol 37 (1), pp. 157-192.

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De Bodt E., F. Lobez et J.-C. Statnik (2005), « Credit Rationing, Customer Relationship and the Number of Banks: A Empirical Anaysis », European Financial Management, vol 11(2), pp. 195-228.

Dewaelhens N. et C. Van Hulle (2008), « Legal Reform and Aggregate Small and Micro Business Bankruptcy Rates: Evidence from the 1997 Belgian Bankruptcy Code », Small Business Economics, vol 31 (4), pp. 409-424.

Diamond D.W. (1991), « Monitoring and Reputation – The Choice between Bank Loans and Direct Placed Debt », Journal of Political Economy, vol 99 (4), pp. 689-721.

Diamond D.W. (1993), « Seniority and Maturity of Debt Contracts », Journal of Financial Economics, vol 33 (3), pp. 341-368.

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Fisher T.C.G et J. Martel (1994), « Will the Bankruptcy Reforms Work? An Empirical Analysis of Financial Reorganization in Canada », Canadian Public Policy/Analyse de Politiques, vol 20 (3), pp. 265-277.

Flannery M. (1986), « Asymetric Information and Risky Debt Maturity Choice », Journal of Finance, vol 41 (1), pp. 19-37.

Foglia S., S. Laviola et P. Marullo Reedtz (1998), « Multiple Banking Relationships and the Fragility of Corporate Borrowers », Journal of Banking and Finance, vol 22 (10-11), pp. 1441-1456.

Franks J.R. et K.G. Nyborg (1992), « Workouts Versus Formal Bankruptcy: Incentives and Inefficiencies under Differente Bankruptcy Codes », working paper.

Franks J.R. et W.N. Torous (1994), « A Comparison of Financial Recontracting in Distressed Exchanges and Chapter 11 Reorganizations », Journal of Financial Economics, vol 35 (3), pp. 349-370.

Gertner R. et D. Scharfstein (1991), « A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization Law », Journal of Finance, vol 46 (4), pp. 1189-1222.

Gilson S.C., K. John et L. Lang (1990), « Troubled Debt Restructurings: An Empirical Study of Private Reorganization of Firms in Default », Journal of Financial Economics, vol 27 (2), pp. 315-354.

Gorton G. et J. Kahn (2000), « The Design of Bank Loan Contracts », Review of Financial Studies, vol 13 (2), pp. 331-364.

Guigou J-D. (1995), « Créanciers mixtes, liquidation et refinancement des entreprises : une analyse théorique », Revue économique, vol 46 (1), pp. 5-12.

Haugen R.A. et L.W. Senbet (1978), « The Insignificance of Bankruptcy Costs to the Theory of Optimal Capital Structure », Journal of Finance, vol 33 (2), pp. 383-393.

Haugen R.A. et L.W.Senbet (1988), « Bankruptcy and Agency Costs : Their Significance to the Theory of Optimal Capital Structure, The insignificance of bankruptcy costs to the theory of optimal capital structure », Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol 23 (1), pp. 27-38.

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Jensen M.C. et W. H. Meckling (1976), « Theory of the firm : managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure », Journal of Financial Economics, vol 3 (4), pp. 305-360.

La Porta R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer et R. W. Vishny (1997), « Legal Determinants of External Finance », Journal of Finance, vol 52 (3), pp. 1131-1150.

La Porta R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer et R. W. Vishny (1998), « Law and Finance », Journal of Political Economy, vol 106 (6), pp. 1113-1155.

Ofek E. (1993), « Capital Structure and Firm Response to Poor Performance. An Empirical Analysis », Journal of Financial Economics, vo l34 (1), pp. 3-30.

Ongena S. et D.C. Smith (2000), « What Determines the Number of Bank Relationships? Cross-country Evidence », Journal of Financial Intermediation, vol 9, pp. 26-56.

Smith C.W. et J.B. Warner (1979), « On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants », Journal of Financial Economics, vol 7 (2), pp. 117-161.

Schwartz A. (1981), « Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories », The Journal of Legal Studies, vol 10 (1), pp. 1-37.

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