To gauge whether a defense mechanism allows a target to reach its goals, we must first determine what is the company’s preferred outcome. Two options are commonly stated.The first one is the price improvement theory under which a corporation may refuse an offer because it believes its true value is greater than the offer at hand. This higher valuation is said to be based on internal financial statements, information, or corporate strategy that the bidder does not have access to. It places them in a situation where accepting the offer would be detrimental to their shareholders. According to the price improvement theory (Schwert, 2000), the refusal of the offer either expresses the company’s desire to wait for another higher offer from a different bidder or serves as a basis for negotiating a higher price. If the discussions are successful, the higher price translates into a bigger premium for the targets’ shareholders, demonstrating an alignment of their interests with the management’s policies.In that case, we have hypothesized that bidders are responsive to this sort of argument (the transaction might become far more expensive than anticipated if antitakeover defenses are used or activated) and are amenable to discussion.