Les quatre options envisagées par l’ILA

• Option A. A voluntary, contractual regime, leaving the resolution of sovereign insolvency to market participants, with or without some official prodding.
• Option B. Adoption of a limited provision for creditor voting on a plan. A limited statutory framework would allow relevant creditors by majority voting to approve a plan which would be binding in the courts of contracting states on all the creditors concerned.
• Option C. Adoption of a wider regime that so far as possible reflects the relevant aspects of insolvency reorganisation regimes. One option for a wider regime is the internationalisation of the basic elements of Chapter 9 of the US Insolvency Code.
• Option D. Adopt measures to strengthen creditor positions and dilute protections for insolvent states.

Collective action clauses and other contractual mechanisms (Option A) affect creditor rights, as does a stay on creditor enforcement (Option B). Likewise, one of the primary goals of domestic insolvency law is to maximise returns for creditors in a collective procedure (Option C). The proper calibration of creditor and debtor interests in sovereign debt restructurings is therefore an overarching issue that is central to each of the four broad policy options discussed.

 

Source : « State insolvency: options for the way forward », rapport du groupe de travail sur l’insolvabilité des États de l’International Law Association, à la conférence de La Haye en 2010.